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 Efforts to amend constitutions at both the state and federal 
level have proliferated since the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts declared in its 2003 Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health1 decision that the exclusion of lesbians and gay men from the 
benefits and protections of marriage is “incompatible with the 
constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and 
equality under law.”2  In the two years following Goodridge, three other 
lower court judges, in California, New York, and Washington, have 
ruled that those state constitutions likewise guarantee same-sex 
couples the right to marry.3  Responding to the recent lesbian and 
gay victories in state court, opponents of same-sex marriage have 
successfully lobbied fourteen states to adopt state constitutional 
amendments that prohibit same-sex marriage.4  Four other states5 
 ∗ Attorney, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, B.A. 1996, J.D. 2001, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  The views expressed herein are my own 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff.  I would like to 
thank Jesse Christensen, Leslie Hickman Loucks, and David Smyth for their very 
thoughtful comments on prior drafts of this Article. 
 1 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 2 Id. at 941. 
 3 Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Woo v. Lockyer, 
No. 4365 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.sftc.org/Docs/ 
Marriage%20Final%20Decision.pdf; Anderson v. Kings County, No. 04-2-04964-4-
SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. Aug. 4, 2004). 
 4 Louisiana and Missouri adopted marriage amendments early in 2004.   
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (adopted Sept. 18, 2004); MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (adopted 
Aug. 3, 2004).  Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah adopted marriage amendments on 
November 2, 2004.  ARK. CONST. amend. 83; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV; KY. CONST.  
§ 233a; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, 
§ 7; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; 
OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.  Kansas adopted its marriage 
amendment on April 5, 2005. KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16(a). 
 5 The four states that adopted marriage amendments before Goodridge were 
Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; HAW. CONST.  
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adopted marriage amendments6 prior to Goodridge, but subsequent to 
similar judicial decisions holding that the Hawaii and Alaska same-sex 
marriage prohibitions violated state constitutional equal protection 
and privacy guarantees.7  In addition to the eighteen states that have 
already adopted marriage amendments, several others are 
considering it.8  Calls for a constitutional response to the judicial 
articulation of marriage rights have not been limited to the state 
context.  President George W. Bush has advocated strongly for an 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would define marriage in 
exclusively heterosexual terms.9
 These state marriage amendments present the potential for at 
least a latent tension with those states’ constitutional equal protection 
or privacy guarantees.  In the case of Alaska and Hawaii, the conflict 
was patent:10  the marriage amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage 
followed court cases in both those states holding that the privacy and 
art. I, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21.  Nevada’s marriage 
amendment was struck by a federal district court as violative of the U.S. Constitution, 
but the decision will almost certainly be appealed to the Eighth Circuit.  See Citizens 
for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005). 
 6 Throughout this Article, I refer to state and federal amendments that define 
marriage in exclusively heterosexual terms or that prohibit same-sex marriage as 
“marriage amendments.”  While I recognize that these amendments might just as 
well be termed “heterosexual marriage amendments” or “anti-same-sex marriage 
amendments,” I opt for “marriage amendments” for simplicity’s sake. 
 7 In its consideration of the Hawaii same-sex marriage prohibition, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court held that the marriage prohibition constituted a gender-based 
classification and remanded to the lower court to determine whether the state had a 
compelling interest in prohibiting same-sex marriage.  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 
64–67 (Haw. 1993); see also Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (discussing in detail 
the claim that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is gender-based 
discrimination).  Three years later, the trial court determined that the state did not 
have a compelling interest justifying its same-sex marriage prohibition.  Baehr v. 
Miike, No. CIV 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, *20-21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
In Alaska, a lower court judge declared same-sex marriage a fundamental right 
under the state constitution’s privacy provision.  See Brause v. Bureau of Vital 
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, *5–6 (Alaska Super. Ct.  
Feb. 27, 1998). 
 8 Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin all 
may be considering marriage amendments.  See Kavan Peterson, Same-sex unions—a 
constitutional race, STATELINE, Sep. 8, 2005, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.a 
ction?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=20695; Cheryl Wetzstein, States 
Lining up to Outlaw Same-sex ‘Marriage’, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A3. 
 9 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, President Calls for 
Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html. 
 10 As it will be in Massachusetts, or Washington, for example, if they ultimately 
ratify their own marriage amendments. 
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equal protection provisions, respectively, constitutionally required that 
same-sex couples be permitted to marry.11
 For many, this constitutional conflict is really no conflict at all.  
After all, it is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that 
when two provisions speak to the same subject, the later and more 
specific provision governs over the earlier and more general 
provision.12  Not surprisingly, this canon of construction has been 
described as axiomatic in the constitutional context as well.13  For 
example, both the Hawaii and Alaska courts assumed, with little 
comment, that those states’ marriage amendments simply mooted gay 
and lesbian claims to marriage under the equal protection and 
privacy provisions.14  Because the marriage amendment and the equal 
 11 See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *5–6; Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *19–21. 
 12 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 51.02, at 186–
87 (6th ed. 2000) (“Where two statutes are involved each of which by its terms 
applies to the facts before the court, the statute which is the more recent of the two 
irreconcilably conflicting statutes prevails. . . .  Where a conflict exists the more 
specific statute controls over the more general one.”).  Although this might be an 
articulation of two separate canons—that is, the canon that later provisions govern 
over earlier and the canon that specific provisions govern over more general—when 
I refer throughout this Article to “the” statutory canon, I mean a composite rule of 
construction that a later and more specific provision governs over a conflicting 
earlier and more general provision. 
 13 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 63 (2004) (“[I]f there is a conflict between a 
general and a special or specific provision in a constitution, the special or specific 
provision must prevail in respect of its subject matter. . . .  If there is a real 
inconsistency between a constitutional amendment and an antecedent provision, the 
amendment must prevail because it is the latest expression of the will of the 
people.”).  See also Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 988 n.57 (Alaska 1999) (striking 
language from the proposed Alaska marriage amendment that “[n]o provision of 
this constitution may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit 
marriage between individuals of the same sex” and remarking that “[t]he objective of 
the second sentence—harmonization of other provisions of the constitution with the 
meaning of the first sentence—will be achieved in any event, for a specific 
amendment controls other more general provisions with which it might conflict”). 
 14 See Brause v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001) 
(dismissing a constitutional challenge to the same-sex marriage prohibition because 
the challenge was effectively mooted by the passage of the marriage amendment).  
Likewise, the Hawaii court dismissed a constitutional challenge to the same-sex 
marriage prohibition, commenting that “[t]he marriage amendment validated [the 
gender restriction in Hawaii’s marriage statute] by taking the statute out of the ambit 
of the equal protection clause.”  Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at 
*6 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).  The Hawaii court’s assumption that the marriage 
amendment removed the marriage prohibition from the ambit of the equal 
protection clause is striking, given the considerable legislative ambiguity on precisely 
this point.  See infra note 111 for a discussion of the legislative history surrounding 
the passage of Hawaii’s marriage amendment. 
Commentators on the Hawaii and Alaska amendments generally agreed that the 
amendments effectively mooted efforts to secure same-sex marriage under the states’ 
equal protection or privacy provisions.  E.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, The 1998 Elections: 
PAINTER FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  5:57:03 PM 
128 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:125 
 
protection or privacy provision both speak to the same subject, the 
later and more specific marriage amendment was assumed 
automatically to trump the earlier and more general equal protection 
or privacy provision. 
 This Article examines whether there are other ways to 
approach a constitution that contains two conflicting provisions—a 
marriage amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage and an equality 
or privacy provision15 that has been or could be broadly construed as 
guaranteeing marriage rights for same-sex couples.16  Must the 
marriage amendment be interpreted as carving same-sex marriage 
from the ambit of a constitution’s privacy or equal protection 
provisions?  This Article suggests that the answer to this question 
should not be so simple, and certainly not as simple as the Hawaii 
and Alaska decisions suggest. 
 I do not argue that state or federal marriage amendments are 
themselves unconstitutional in light of equal protection or privacy 
guarantees found elsewhere in the constitution.17  Rather, I argue 
The States – Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B1 (“Hawaii voters gave the 
Legislature authorization to overturn a court ruling and ban same-sex marriages.”); 
Elaine Herscher, Same-Sex Marriage Suffers Setback: Alaska, Hawaii Voters Say “ No”, S.F. 
CHRON., Nov. 5, 1998, at A2 (discussing the amendment as barring marriage but 
allowing for the possibility that the state supreme court might constitutionally 
mandate the benefits of marriage); Final Election Results: Colorado Through Illinois, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 5, 1998, at 6A (“Supporters successfully headed off a state Supreme 
Court ruling that could legalize same-sex marriages.”); Carole Migden, Challenge Faces 
the Gay Community, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 22, 1998, at A23 (“Voters in both Hawaii and 
Alaska recently approved initiatives by a 2 to 1 margin to ban same-sex marriages, 
rendering moot any court action on the matter.”). 
 15 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck state laws criminalizing certain sexual 
conduct between same-sex partners under the Due Process Clause, not as violating a 
right to privacy, but instead as violating a liberty interest.  539 U.S. 558, 578–79 
(2003).  See also Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. 
Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002–2003 21 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003).  
I use the term “privacy provision” throughout this Article to include constitutional 
provisions that may be interpreted to protect liberty interests. 
 16 The arguments in this Article are intended to apply to both state and federal 
constitutions.  Consequently, when I refer to a constitution (as opposed to the 
Constitution), I am typically referring to any state or federal constitution that 
contains internally conflicting provisions, i.e., a marriage amendment and an equality 
or privacy provision.  References to the Constitution refer specifically to the United 
States Constitution. 
 17 Others have argued that a constitutional amendment may itself be 
unconstitutional by virtue of it contravening certain fundamental constitutional 
norms.  See, e.g., Charles A. Kelbley, Are There Limits to Constitutional Change? Rawls on 
Comprehensive Doctrines, Unconstitutional Amendments, and the Basis of Equality, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2004) (expounding on theoretical limitations on 
constitutional amendments grounded in Rawlsian theories of justice and equality); 
Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980) 
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that the statutory canon of construction—that a later and more 
specific provision governs over an earlier and more general 
provision—is an uneasy fit in the constitutional context.  Because the 
intuition that a marriage amendment automatically trumps an equal 
protection or privacy provision is largely guided by the intuitive 
applicability of the canon, it follows that if our canon of construction 
is suspect in the constitutional context, so ought be our presumption 
that the marriage amendment ipso facto governs. 
 Part I of this Article suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Twenty-first Amendment cases can fairly be read as a model for 
abandoning the statutory canon in the constitutional context.  
Instead of employing the canon in its Twenty-first Amendment cases, 
the Supreme Court has instead articulated an approach in these 
liquor cases that involves weighing the constitutional interests at stake 
in any given case in which a later and more specific provision 
conflicts with an earlier and more general provision.  Part II offers a 
second reason for suspecting that the canon of statutory construction 
is an inappropriate tool for at least certain constitutional provisions—
namely that some constitutional provisions are, properly conceived, 
atemporal.  For these provisions, it makes little sense to view one 
provision as governing over another by virtue of it being the “later” 
provision.  Although Parts I and II offer some judicial precedent and 
theoretical basis for dispensing with the canon of construction in the 
constitutional context, they do not on their own suggest that a judge 
in fact should make the interpretive choice to reject the canon when 
considering conflicting constitutional mandates relating to same-sex 
marriage.  Part III picks up where Parts I and II leave off by providing 
a normative framework for considering when a judge should reject 
the canon.  Specifically, I argue that, for reasons of constitutional 
legitimacy, it may be altogether desirable at some point in the future 
for a judge to follow the Supreme Court’s Twenty-first Amendment 
model and reject the statutory canon of construction in the marriage 
context.  In other words, to avoid undermining the legitimacy of state 
and federal constitutions that contain marriage amendments, or 
more properly, our collective faith in the authority of our 
constitutions, a judge might plausibly weigh the constitutional 
interests at stake in any given case and interpret the earlier and more 
(arguing that an amendment might be invalid if it contravenes certain basic notions 
of human dignity); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Constitutional?, 
100 YALE L.J. 1073 (1991) (arguing that the flag burning amendment would have 
been unconstitutional as contravening natural law principles enforceable under the 
Ninth Amendment). 
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general constitutional principle of equality or privacy as ultimately 
governing over the marriage question. 
I 
 Although the statutory canon of construction—that later and 
more specific provisions govern over earlier and more general 
provisions—has often been invoked in the constitutional context, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s modern Twenty-first Amendment cases can be 
read as a model for rejecting the canon in the constitutional context.  
In offering alternatives to the statutory approach, the Court’s liquor 
cases illuminate the range of interpretive choices available to a judge 
when resolving a tension between a marriage amendment and an 
equal protection or privacy provision.  To write, as it did, without any 
discussion at all, that the Hawaii marriage amendment removed the 
same-sex marriage prohibition from the ambit of the state equal 
protection clause, the Hawaii Supreme Court obscured that range of 
interpretive possibilities.18  To put it differently, the view that 
marriage amendments trump other more general equality or privacy 
provisions is one interpretive choice, but not the only plausible 
choice. 
A.  The Twenty-first Amendment v. the Commerce Clause 
 Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, the constitutional 
amendment repealing Prohibition, provides an interesting case study 
for exploring the interpretive possibilities open to a judge 
considering a later and more specific constitutional provision that 
conflicts with an earlier and more general provision.  Section 2 
provides that, “[t]he transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited.”19  A plain language reading appears to 
constitutionally validate any state law relating to the transportation or 
importation of liquor into that state.  The Commerce Clause, on the 
other hand, drafted some 150 years before the Twenty-first 
Amendment, has been interpreted to place certain restrictions on the 
states’ authority to pass laws that burden interstate commerce.  The 
Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o 
 18 See Baehr, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6. 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
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regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”20
 Any prohibition on states’ ability to regulate interstate 
commerce, however, is not contained in the plain text of the 
Commerce Clause, but is instead inferred by negative implication.  
Under the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, states are not 
permitted to regulate interstate commerce because “when a State 
proceeds to regulate commerce . . . among the several states, it is 
exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing 
the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.”21  Without any 
express textual authority, then, “the doctrine [is] that the commerce 
clause, by its own force and without natural legislation, puts it into 
the power of the Court to place limits on state authority.”22
 How, then, should a court resolve a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to a state law that regulates the importation or 
transportation of liquor into that state?  Should the state law be 
stricken as violative of the dormant Commerce Clause, or has the 
state regulation been “saved” by Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment?  One might plausibly argue that the canons of statutory 
construction easily resolve any conflict between the two constitutional 
provisions.  Section 2 by its terms prohibits the violation of state 
importation and transportation laws relating to liquor.  As the later 
amendment that deals specifically with state regulation of liquor, 
Section 2 should be regarded as the clearest and latest expression of 
constitutional intent with respect to the validity of state attempts to 
regulate interstate commerce in liquor. 
 Indeed, until the mid-1960s, this was precisely the Supreme 
Court’s approach to Section 2 and the dormant Commerce Clause.  
The Court viewed Section 2 as granting states authority “to legislate 
concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by the 
Commerce Clause.”23  Just three years after the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, the Court in State Board of Equalization v. 
Young’s Market Co.24 upheld a state statute imposing a licensing fee to 
import beer into its borders, a fee that according to the Court would 
have been unquestionably unconstitutional as a direct burden on 
interstate commerce, were it not for the plain language of Section 2 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 21 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 22 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY & WAITE 
18 (1937). 
 23 Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (emphasis added). 
 24 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936). 
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of the Twenty-first Amendment.25  Justice Brandeis’ language in 
Young’s Market explains the Court’s early view of the relationship 
between Section 2 and the dormant Commerce Clause: 
The words used [in Section 2] are apt to confer upon the state 
the power to forbid all importations which do not comply with the 
conditions which it prescribes.  The plaintiffs ask us to limit this 
broad command.  They request us to construe the amendment as 
saying, in effect: The state may prohibit the importation of 
intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and 
sale within its borders; but if it permits such manufacture and 
sale, it must let imported liquors compete with the domestic on 
equal terms.  To say that, would involve not a construction of the 
amendment, but a rewriting of it.26
Three years later, in Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control 
Commission,27 the Court similarly upheld another state law that 
discriminated against certain liquor imports, clarifying that “the right 
of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating 
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause.”28  Although not 
expressly invoking the statutory canons of construction, the Court’s 
early approach in Young’s Market and Indianapolis Brewing is consistent 
with the view that Section 2, as the later and more specific 
constitutional provision, should govern over any question concerning 
the constitutionality of state liquor import laws. 
 But the Court signaled a change in its approach to Section 2 
beginning with its 1964 case, Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor 
Corp.,29 in which the Court considered a challenge to the New York 
State Liquor Authority’s prohibition on the sale of bottled wines and 
liquors to international travelers at John F. Kennedy International 
Airport.30  The Court departed from its previous holdings that the 
Twenty-first Amendment removes from the ambit of the Commerce 
Clause all state regulation of the importation or transportation of 
liquor.  Instead, the Court indicated that “[t]o draw a conclusion 
from [the previous] line of decisions that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause 
 25 Id. at 62. 
 26 Id. 
 27 305 U.S. 391 (1939). 
 28 Id. at 394; see also Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938) 
(holding that the rule that “discrimination against imported liquor is permissible 
although it is not an incident of reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic, was 
settled by [Young’s Market]”). 
 29 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
 30 Id. at 326–27. 
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wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would . . . be 
an absurd oversimplification.”31  Rather, “[b]oth the Twenty-first 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same 
constitution.  Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be 
considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and 
interests at stake in any concrete case.”32
 The Court has since characterized its approach in Hostetter as a 
“pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers.”33  As the 
Court explained in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,34 where it struck  
a state excise tax discriminating against imported liquor, the  
courts must determine in any concrete case “whether the  
principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently 
implicated . . . to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that 
would otherwise be offended.”35  By espousing this balancing of 
constitutional interests, the Court in Bacchus Imports directly rejected 
its earlier approach in Young’s Market, in which the Court held that 
Section 2 expressly permits a state to discriminate against out-of-state 
liquor—even though such discrimination would otherwise have been 
forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause.36  In essence, then, the 
Court rejected its earlier approach to Section 2 that was consistent 
with the statutory canon (i.e., Section 2, as the later and more specific 
provision, governs) and suggested instead that Section 2 and 
 31 Id. at 331–32. 
 32 Id. at 332 (emphasis added).  Justice Stevens has criticized the Court’s 
subsequent understanding of this language in Hostetter as qualifying the Court’s 
earlier holdings that the Twenty-first Amendment leaves state regulation of liquor 
unfettered by the dormant Commerce Clause.  Rather, in Justice Stevens’ view, by 
indicating that the earlier precedents do not establish that the “Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause,” the Court in 
Hostetter was discussing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, not state power 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.  See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 
263, 283–84 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  And in any event, in Justice Stevens’ 
view, this language in Hostetter is dicta because the case was decided on other 
grounds: the Twenty-first Amendment had already been construed as leaving 
undisturbed Commerce Clause constraints with regard to liquor shipped through, 
rather than to, a state.  Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 137 (1944).  Because the 
Twenty-first Amendment was not implicated by a shipment through the state (the 
liquor in Hostetter was ultimately shipped out of the country), it was unnecessary to 
pronounce on the relationship between Section 2 and the Commerce Clause.  
Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 284 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 33 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 109 
(1980). 
 34 Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. 263. 
 35 Id. at 275–76; see also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 
(1984). 
 36 See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
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Commerce Clause constitutional interests should be balanced.  And 
although consistently purporting to embrace its earlier holdings that 
Section 2 grants the states broad regulatory authority over liquor,37 in 
this balancing of constitutional interests, the Court has nearly always 
favored the federal interests embodied in the Commerce Clause over 
the state interests embodied in Section 2.38
 I interpret Bacchus Imports as the culmination of the Court’s 
post-Hostetter approach that Section 2 and Commerce Clause interests 
should be weighed in any given case.  Bacchus Imports is significant 
precisely because it rejects the Court’s earlier approach to Section 
2—an approach that had viewed Section 2, the later and more 
specific constitutional provision, as controlling in the liquor 
commerce context. 
 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has attempted to 
recontextualize its holding in Bacchus Imports, not as rejecting the 
statutory canon, but instead as construing Section 2 and the dormant 
Commerce Clause harmoniously—a reading purportedly grounded 
in the history of Section 2 and the pre-Prohibition Wilson and Webb-
Kenyon Acts.39  On this reading, because the text of Section 2 closely 
tracks the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act, legislation that was 
intended to permit dry states to prohibit liquor imports, the intent of 
Section 2 must have been similar: primarily to restore to dry states 
after repeal the same authority to forbid liquor imports they enjoyed 
pre-Prohibition.  For advocates of this reading of Section 2, the 
provision simply constitutionalized the pre-Prohibition state police 
power over liquor as reflected in the Webb-Kenyon Act, which in turn 
ostensibly codified the police power as reflected in the Wilson Act—a 
police power that included the right to ban, but not discriminate 
 37 See infra note 45. 
 38 The Court, for example, has stricken state price affirmation statutes, which 
typically require that in-state prices of liquor not exceed prices charged out of state.  
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State 
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).  And weighing constitutional values, not with 
regard to the dormant Commerce Clause, but instead with regard to Congress’s 
positive Commerce Clause powers, the Court has also favored federal interests over 
the state interests embodied in Section 2.  E.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 
335 (1987) (invalidating a state liquor law that conflicted with provisions of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (same).  
But see North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (holding that a state 
liquor regulation impacting federal law with respect to procurement of liquor on 
federal military bases did not violate the Supremacy Clause, with only Justice Scalia 
arguing in a concurring opinion that Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment is 
central to the holding that the Supremacy Clause is not violated). 
 39 See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005). 
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against, out-of-state liquor.40  Under this reading, the discriminatory 
tax in Bacchus Imports presented no problem at all under Section 2 of 
the Twenty-first Amendment because it was precisely this sort of 
discriminatory treatment that Section 2 was never intended to cover.  
And, to round out the argument, because the statutory canon would 
be applicable in Bacchus Imports only if Section 2 and the Commerce 
Clause were in conflict, Bacchus Imports ipso facto cannot fairly be 
read as rejecting that canon of construction. 
 The Court’s recent interpretation of Bacchus Imports—that it 
reflects a harmonization of Section 2 and the Commerce Clause—
although plausible, is no more plausible than my reading of Bacchus 
Imports as recognizing that the constitutional provisions conflict and 
then following the earlier and more general of the two.  As a 
preliminary matter, any explanation of Bacchus Imports based on the 
history of Section 2, in turn based on the history of the Webb-Kenyon 
Act, is spurious.41  To be sure, many legislators advocating for the 
Twenty-first Amendment probably viewed Section 2 as permitting dry 
states to forbid liquor imports and nothing more.  Others viewed 
Section 2 as allowing even wet states to burden interstate commerce 
so long as out-of-state interests were treated exactly the same as in-
state interests.  But there were still others, including many of the most 
prominent anti-prohibitionists, who agitated for repeal in large part 
 40 Before 1900, the Supreme Court frustrated state prohibition by holding under 
the dormant Commerce Clause that dry states were not permitted to ban liquor 
imports.  See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).  Reacting to Leisy, Congress 
enacted the Wilson Act, which was intended to allow dry states authority to forbid 
liquor imports.  26 Stat. 313 (1890).  The Wilson Act, by its terms, allowed states to 
regulate imported liquor “to the same extent and in the same manner as though 
such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory.”  Id.  The 
Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Wilson Act, but again frustrated state 
prohibition by narrowly construing the Act as not permitting a state to forbid 
interstate shipments directly to consumers.  E.g., Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898).  
Congress reacted again to protect dry states’ right to prohibit liquor by enacting the 
Webb-Kenyon Act, which prohibited the shipment of liquor into a state in violation 
of any state law.  37 Stat. 699 (1913). 
There is disagreement as to whether the Webb-Kenyon Act should be 
interpreted as incorporating the Wilson Act’s rule that a state may not discriminate 
against out-of-state liquor.  A majority on the Supreme Court very recently adopted 
this view.  Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1901; see also Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 
F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Like the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act before 
Prohibition, § 2 enables a state to do to importation of liquor . . . what it chooses to 
do to internal sales of liquor, but nothing more.”).  Others, however, including Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas, view the 
plain language and history of Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment and the 
Webb-Kenyon Act as expressly permitting states to discriminate against out-of-state 
liquor.  See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 41 See supra note 40. 
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because they believed the federal government had dramatically 
overreached during Prohibition; federal involvement in liquor 
regulation after 1919 had, in their view, trampled state police power, 
bred government corruption, and resulted in widespread contempt 
for the law.42  To many of these anti-prohibitionists, Section 2 might 
well have been taken at face value: as returning to the states absolute 
control over liquor imports, including a right to discriminate against 
out-of-state interests.43  And, indeed, to the extent that Section 2 was 
intended to return absolute control to the states, Section 2 and the 
dormant Commerce Clause would have been in direct conflict in 
Bacchus Imports (and the case could consequently be read as rejecting 
the statutory canon).  But to rely on isolated statements of federal 
legislators44 or the similarity between Section 2 and the Webb-Kenyon 
 42 For a well-documented discussion of the many motivations behind the repeal 
movement, see DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 197–99 (2d ed. 
2000). 
 43 Professor Brannon P. Denning has collected a number of contemporary 
newspaper accounts illustrating that the debate over Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment was largely between those advocating for federal supervision over liquor 
and those advocating for state control of liquor without federal limitation.  Brannon P. 
Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-
first Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 
308 n.51 (2002). 
Justice O’Connor has similarly argued that Section 2 returned “absolute control 
of the liquor trade to the states” without federal interference.  324 Liquor Corp., 479 
U.S. at 356 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  As proposed originally, the Twenty-first 
Amendment contained a Section 3, which granted the federal government 
concurrent authority over some aspects of commerce in liquor.  That provision was 
rejected, in Justice O’Connor’s view, because it was perceived as undermining the 
absolute control of liquor commerce vested in the states by Section 2.  See id. at 354–
55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1909 (Stevens J., 
dissenting) (“The notion that discriminating state laws violated the unwritten 
prohibition against balkanizing the American economy—while persuasive in 
contemporary times when alcohol is viewed as an ordinary article of commerce—
would have seemed strange indeed to the millions of Americans who condemned the 
use of the ‘demon rum’ in the 1920’s and 1930’s.”). 
 44 As the Court has observed, the history of Section 2 is ambiguous in part 
because the same legislators often said contradictory things about the provision, 
some comments suggesting a narrow reading of the state power contemplated by the 
provision and others a broad reading.  See 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 347 n.10 
(noting the conflicting remarks of Senator John James Blaine, the Senate sponsor of 
the amendment); see also Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: 
Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State 
Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1631–35 
(2000) (discussing the variety of legislative opinions as to the effect of Section 2).  
One wonders why so much emphasis is placed on federal legislative intent; at least as 
important in determining the purposes of Section 2 (and perhaps illustrative of just 
how fictional claims of Section 2’s intent necessarily are) is the intent of the 
individual delegates in each of the ratifying state conventions or the intent of the 
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Act to suggest that the sole intent of Section 2 was to only minimally 
impact the dormant Commerce Clause, neglects the multiplicity of 
reasons state and federal lawmakers advocated for repeal. 
 But even if the question of the single intent of Section 2 is a 
coherent one, and even if a thorough examination of the history of 
repeal vindicates the narrow interpretation of Section 2, this 
historical exegesis was nevertheless not the basis of the Court’s 
holding at the time it decided Bacchus Imports.45  In Bacchus Imports, 
the Court described the legislative history as “obscur[e],” remarking 
that “[n]o clear consensus concerning the meaning of [Section 2] is 
apparent.”46  Despite that lack of consensus, the Court noted that 
whatever its purpose, “[t]he central purpose of the provision was not to 
empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to 
competition.”47  And then, following Hostetter, the Court weighed the 
state interest (economic protectionism) against the federal interest 
people voting for repeal when the issue was put up for popular vote in many of the 
states. 
 45 More importantly, by consistently reiterating that Section 2 grants near plenary 
power to the states to regulate liquor commerce, the Court, until Granholm, has 
implicitly rejected any view of Section 2 as narrowly drawn.  E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. 
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514–16 (1996) (“[T]he text of the Twenty-first 
Amendment supports the view that, while it grants the States authority over 
commerce that might otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no 
limits whatsoever on other constitutional provisions.”); North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 431 
(“[W]ithin the area of its jurisdiction, the State has ‘virtually complete control’ over 
the importation and sale of liquor and the structure of the liquor distribution 
system” (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712 (1984), which in 
turn relied on Young’s Market for the proposition that Section 2 “reserves to the States 
power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent 
the Amendment, would clearly be invalid under the Commerce Clause”)); 324 Liquor 
Corp., 479 U.S. at 346 (same); see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S.  
at 110 (same). 
 46 Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 274; see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S. 
at 107 n.10.  The Court advocated the Hostetter balancing of federal and state 
interests again in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, but declined to do so on the basis of the 
legislative history of Section 2.  479 U.S. 335, 346–47 (1987) (arguing that the 
legislative history is susceptible to both broad and narrow constructions of Section 
2).  Similarly, holding that the Twenty-first Amendment did not bar application of 
the Sherman Act to a state pricing system, the Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Ass’n noted the conflicting historical evidence on the purpose of Section 2 and the 
lack of consensus in the ratifying state conventions as to its thrust.  445 U.S. at 107.  
Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976) (although the Court noted in dicta 
the similarity between Section 2 and the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, see supra 
note 40, and commented on the “framers’ clear intention of constitutionalizing the 
Commerce Clause framework established under those statutes,” the Court did not 
explain what that framework was, but instead, relying on its older cases, indicated 
that “the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the 
Commerce Clause”). 
 47 Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added). 
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(prevention of economic Balkanization).  According to the Court, 
the federal interest was paramount, but not because Section 2 was, by 
its history, inapplicable to discriminatory state laws.48  Indeed, by 
categorizing the empowerment of economic protectionism as not the 
central purpose of Section 2, the Court seemed to acknowledge that 
Section 2 and the dormant Commerce Clause are in conflict to some 
degree with respect to discriminatory liquor laws that have some 
economic motivation.  But because there isn’t a traditional 
temperance or other classic Section 2 purpose behind the state law, 
and because the law violates a central tenet of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, the Court considered the federal interests as embodied in the 
dormant Commerce Clause controlling over the very weak state 
Twenty-first Amendment interests.49  The important point is that the 
Court weighed constitutional interests precisely because both Section 
2 and the dormant Commerce Clause were thought to apply: the two 
provisions were not read harmoniously, and the case can 
consequently be read as rejecting the traditional canon of 
construction. 
 Beginning with Hostetter, then, and culminating with its 
decision in Bacchus Imports, the Court has consistently advocated a 
balancing of state and federal interests when considering conflicts 
between Section 2 and the Commerce Clause.  This post-Hostetter 
balancing is significant in that it seems to abandon the statutory 
canon of construction that might otherwise have been thought to 
apply, and indeed apparently was applied in Young’s Market, among 
others, just after Section 2’s ratification.  This split with Young’s Market 
is all the more striking in light of the Court’s modern approach, 
which at least until Granholm v. Heald,50 has apparently not been 
guided by a historical view of Section 2 as largely harmonious with 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  Rather, acknowledging the 
ambiguous historical record, the Court has consistently favored 
federal interests embodied in the earlier and more general dormant 
Commerce Clause over the state interests embodied in the later and 
more specific language of Section 2.  Not surprisingly, the Court’s 
 48 If the Court were persuaded that Section 2, as a matter of history, 
constitutionalized the pre-Prohibition non-discrimination principle ostensibly 
codified by the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, then Section 2 would have been 
inapplicable to any discriminatory law, regardless of whether that discrimination was 
motivated by economic protectionism, protection of morals, promotion of 
temperance, or anything else, thus negating the need to engage in any balancing of 
federal and state interests. 
 49 Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276. 
 50 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text . 
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treatment of Section 2, and it’s subordination of that later and more 
specific amendment to the dictates of the earlier and more general51 
Commerce Clause, has lead many commentators to suggest that the 
Commerce Clause appears to be almost entirely unaffected by the 
passage of the Twenty-first Amendment.52
The Court’s treatment of Section 2 and the dormant Commerce 
Clause is indeed instructive for a judge considering the relationship 
between a late and specific marriage amendment and an earlier and 
more general equal protection or privacy provision.  Might the judge 
not weigh constitutional interests in such a case?53  Might the judge 
not find the interests of equality or autonomy embodied in the 
earlier and more general equal protection or privacy provisions 
 51 The generality of the dormant Commerce Clause cannot be overstated.  Not 
only does the provision not mention liquor commerce, it does not even mention 
state regulation.  Putting the point more plainly, considering a challenge to an 
Indiana law prohibiting all out-of-state shipments to Indiana consumers, Judge 
Easterbrook framed the issue this way: “This case pits the twenty-first amendment, 
which appears in the Constitution, against the ‘dormant commerce clause,’ which 
does not.”  Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 52 E.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 349 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for allowing the states no more freedom to regulate commerce 
in beer than it does commerce in milk notwithstanding the Twenty-first 
Amendment); 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 352–53 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(observing that “the Court has, over the years, so ‘completely distorted the Twenty-
first Amendment’ that ‘[i]t now has a barely discernible effect in Commerce Clause 
cases” (quoting Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 98 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting))); Denning, supra note 43, at 299–300 (“That courts continue to construe 
narrowly—nearly to the vanishing point—a specific reservation of state power at 
federalism’s high tide of judicial enforceability, seems particularly worthy of 
attention.”); Douglass, supra note 44, at 1644 (“[N]o state liquor laws are immune 
from potential invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause . . . .”). 
 53 It might be suggested that the Twenty-first Amendment model is an ill fit in the 
marriage amendment context.  Abandoning the canon of construction with respect 
to Section 2 narrows its operation, but nevertheless leaves something of Section 2 
intact.  If the canon were abandoned in the marriage amendment context, however, 
the marriage amendment would be rendered entirely null.  A reading giving effect to 
all constitutional language is far preferable to one rendering a portion of the 
document a nullity. 
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has not always avoided 
interpretative strategies that potentially render portions of the Constitution null.  See 
infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court’s 
endorsement of an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that would render 
portions of the Fifth Amendment a nullity.  More importantly, as discussed in Part 
III, a court might elect to follow the Twenty-first Amendment model if and when the 
legitimacy of a constitution itself is undermined by the continued vitality of a 
marriage amendment.  In such a case, readings that give effect to the constitution as 
a whole are preferable to readings that give effect to each and every one of its 
provisions. 
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paramount over the interests of defining marriage in exclusively 
heterosexual terms?54
B. The Twenty-first Amendment v. The Import-Export Clause, the First 
Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause 
 On the same day the Court decided Hostetter, the case that 
signaled what would become the Court’s eventual abandonment of 
the statutory canon in Commerce Clause cases,55 the Court also 
considered a challenge to a Kentucky liquor law under the 
Constitution’s Import-Export Clause.56  The law at issue in Department 
of Revenue v. James Beam Distilling Co.57 prohibited the shipment of 
alcohol into Kentucky unless the importer obtained a permit and 
paid a tax of ten cents on each proof gallon in the shipment.58  
Striking the Kentucky law as an unconstitutional tax on imports, the 
 54 The Bacchus Imports model might be particularly relevant not in a marriage 
(qua marriage) challenge, but instead an equal protection or due process challenge 
to the denial of marriage benefits for same-sex couples.  Some commentators have 
suggested that the language of the proposed federal marriage amendment, in 
addition to prohibiting lesbian or gay marriage, may also deny same-sex couples the 
benefits of marriage (as protected by civil unions, domestic partnerships, or other 
non-marriage legal arrangements).  E.g., Andrew Sullivan, Bush on Gay Marriage: 
Uncivil, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, July 13, 2004, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/ 
13/opinion/main629390.shtml; Peterson, supra note 8 (reporting that the marriage 
amendments in Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah also ban civil unions or other 
partnership benefits).  Assuming that a particular marriage amendment would 
proscribe both marriage and the benefits of marriage, if a court were to follow 
Bacchus Imports in considering a challenge to the denial of marriage benefits, the 
court might weigh constitutional interests rather than employ the canon of 
construction that would otherwise require following the later and more specific 
constitutional provision.  Following Bacchus Imports, that court may well find that 
although within its language, the denial of civil unions was not a central purpose of the 
marriage amendment.  And because the equal protection or due process interests 
would outweigh those non-core marriage amendment interests, the court may well 
elect to follow the earlier and more general equal protection or due process 
provision, holding that lesbian and gay couples have a constitutional right to the 
benefits of marriage, but not marriage itself. 
 55 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 56 The Import-Export Clause provides that: 
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or 
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary 
for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and 
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of 
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to 
the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 57 377 U.S. 341, 342 (1964). 
 58 Id. at 342. 
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Court held that it “has never so much as intimated that the Twenty-
first Amendment has operated to permit what the Import-Export 
Clause precisely and explicitly forbids.”59
 Dissenting, Justice Black criticized both Hostetter and James 
Beam Distilling, which held that the Commerce Clause and the 
Import-Export Clause, respectively, remained largely undisturbed by 
the Twenty-first Amendment.  According to Justice Black, the Court 
had deprived the states of the power to regulate the liquor business 
by taxation or otherwise—a power expressly granted the states by the 
Twenty-first Amendment.60  Even more telling for our purposes, in 
his discussion of the Court’s treatment of the Import-Export Clause, 
Justice Black expressly noted the Court’s abandonment of the 
statutory canon of construction: 
[T]he clause against taxing imports is general . . . .  Section 2 of 
the Twenty-first Amendment, by contrast, is not general in its 
application. . . .  It seems a trifle off to hold that an Amendment 
adopted in 1933 in specific terms to meet a specific twentieth-
century problem must yield to a provision written in 1787 to meet 
a more general, although no less important, problem.61
The Court’s treatment of constitutional conflicts between the Import-
Export Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment has disturbed some 
commentators,62 but it is consistent with the Court’s treatment of 
state liquor regulation cases under the Commerce Clause: 
notwithstanding the specificity and the timing of Section 2 of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, it must be considered in light of other 
earlier and more general constitutional provisions.  And most of the 
time, Section 2 loses. 
 In addition to the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export 
Clause, the Court has also considered challenges to state liquor laws 
on First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds.  Each time, 
Section 2 has failed to save the state regulation of liquor.  In 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,63 the Court struck a Rhode Island ban 
on the advertising of liquor prices by manufacturers, wholesalers, or 
 59 Id. at 344. 
 60 Id. at 346 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 61 Id. at 347–48 (emphasis added). 
 62 Denning, supra note 43, at 323 (“Arguably, the [Twenty-first] Amendment 
necessarily qualified the [Import-Export] Clause . . . .”); David S. Versfelt, Note, The 
Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors,  
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1584–85 (1975) (“It would not . . . have been so 
‘extraordinary’ to conclude that the Twenty-first amendment had ‘repealed’ the 
export-import clause with respect to intoxicants.”). 
 63 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
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shippers from without the state, or by licensed persons within, as 
violative of the First Amendment.64  Considering the argument that 
the Twenty-first Amendment should tilt the Court’s analysis in the 
state’s favor, the Court held that “the Twenty-first Amendment does 
not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws abridging the 
freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment.”65  By holding 
that the Twenty-first Amendment does not qualify the First 
Amendment, the Court arguably followed the more general of the 
two provisions: the sort of commercial speech at issue in 44 
Liquormart (price advertisements) is not “core” speech typically 
entitled to maximum protection under the First Amendment.66  
Section 2, by contrast, would seem specifically to delegate to the 
states broad discretion to regulate the liquor industry as each state 
sees fit.67  Again, the Court appeared to favor the interests embodied 
in an earlier and more general constitutional provision, rather than 
the state’s interests in liquor regulation embodied in the later and 
more specific amendment. 
 In Craig v. Boren,68 the Court considered an equal protection 
challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of “non-
alcoholic”69 beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under 
the age of 18.70  Purporting to justify the disparate treatment of males 
as designed to enhance traffic safety, the state provided statistical 
evidence establishing that, among other things, of people between 
the ages of 18 and 21, more men than women were arrested for 
driving while intoxicated.  Although conceding that this had some 
 64 Id. at 516. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I will take my guidance as to what the 
Constitution forbids, with regard to a text as indeterminate as the First Amendment’s 
preservation of the ‘freedom of speech,’ and where the core offense of suppressing 
particular political ideas is not at issue, from the long-accepted practices of the 
American people.”) (emphasis added). 
 67 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
106–07 (1980) (stating that the Twenty-first Amendment “grants the states virtually 
complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to 
structure the liquor distribution system”); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 
346 (1987); see also North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431 (1990). 
 68 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 69 The “non-alcoholic” beer at issue was actually 3.2% alcohol by volume and was 
therefore within the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment.  Id. at 192. 
 70 Id. 
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statistical significance,71 the Court nevertheless found the evidence 
insufficient to justify a gender-based classification.  In a complete 
reversal of its prior cases,72 the Court held that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has no effect whatsoever on equal protection 
requirements.73  It is worth noting that in the Equal Protection 
context (as in the First Amendment context), as opposed to the 
Commerce Clause context, the Court did not weigh constitutional 
interests when considering a conflict with Section 2.  Rather, the 
Court held that state liquor laws, regardless of their specific 
authorization in the text of Section 2—even liquor laws reflecting a 
rational legislative judgment borne out by supporting statistical 
evidence74—cannot withstand scrutiny under the earlier-enacted and 
more general Equal Protection provision if the liquor laws classify on 
the basis of gender.75
 71 The Court conceded that the disparity in arrests (.18% of females versus 2% of 
males) “is not trivial in a statistical sense.”  Id. at 201. 
 72 E.g., Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938) (“[S]ince the 
adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment, the equal protection clause is not 
applicable to imported intoxicating liquor.”); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s 
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936) (“A classification recognized by the Twenty-First 
Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth.”); see also Indianapolis 
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939) (“[D]iscrimination 
between domestic and imported intoxicating liquors, . . . is not prohibited by the 
equal protection clause.”). 
 73 Craig, 429 U.S. at 208–09 (“We thus hold that the operation of the Twenty-first 
Amendment does not alter the application of equal protection standards that 
otherwise govern this case.”). 
 74 The Court for the first time in Craig subjected gender-based classifications to 
intermediate judicial scrutiny.  Id. at 197-98.  The Court, however, almost 
unanimously agreed that the statute would have survived under the less exacting 
rational basis test.  See id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (indicating that eight 
members of the Court did not find the statute irrational).  The lower court, 
comprised of a three-judge panel, upheld the law under the rational basis test.  
Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Okla. 1975); see also R. Darcy & Jenny 
Sanbrano, Oklahoma in the Development of Equal Rights: The ERA, 3.2% Beer, Juvenile 
Justice, and Craig v. Boren, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1009, 1045 (1997). 
 75 Note that the Court does not resolve the issue in 44 Liquormart or Craig by 
holding that the state regulations at issue fall outside the scope of Section 2 because 
the regulations are not related to the “transportation” or “importation” of liquor.  
Instead, even assuming the applicability of Section 2, the latest and most specific 
provision that speaks to the state law at issue, the Court held that Section 2 may 
never trump the earlier and more general dictates of the First Amendment or Equal 
Protection Clause that would otherwise apply. 
Craig, unlike 44 Liquormart, claims a historical basis for reading the earlier and 
more general Equal Protection provision as controlling.  Craig, 429 U.S. at 206 
(“Neither the text nor the history of the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it 
qualifies individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment where the sale of liquor is concerned.”).  To the extent the Craig Court 
was actually driven by a historical exegesis of Section 2, the Craig decision could be 
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Since the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court 
has considered the relationship between Section 2 and various more 
general and earlier-enacted constitutional provisions.  Whether 
considering the dormant Commerce Clause,76 the Commerce 
Clause,77 the Import-Export Clause,78 the First Amendment,79 or the 
Equal Protection clause,80 since the mid-1960s, the Court has 
consistently favored the earlier and more general provision.  
Meanwhile, the Court has given little weight—practically none—to 
the states’ Section 2 authority to regulate liquor, notwithstanding the 
specificity of Section 2’s text and the later date of its enactment.  
Regardless of the breadth of state authority to regulate liquor under 
the text of the Twenty-first Amendment, the cases make clear that the 
text of that amendment does not “license the States to ignore their 
obligations under other provisions of the Constitution.”81  Indeed, 
the Court has so restricted the effect of Section 2 as to render it 
nearly null. 
The Court’s Twenty-first Amendment cases can be read as 
abandoning the statutory canon of construction that would have 
otherwise found Section 2, as the later and more specific provision, 
controlling in the liquor context.  This rejection of the statutory 
canon illustrates the interpretive choices available to a judge 
considering a conflict between a marriage amendment and an earlier 
and more general equal protection or privacy provision.  By weighing 
interests embodied in particular constitutional provisions, 
irrespective of the provisions’ timing and specificity, the Supreme 
Court provides a conceptual framework within which a court might 
find a same-sex marriage ban constitutionally infirm, notwithstanding 
read in ways other than the one I suggest (i.e., the Court did not simply abandon the 
canon of construction; rather, as a matter of historical interpretation, the later 
amendment was not intended to qualify the earlier provision, the two provisions are 
not really in conflict, and thus the canon of construction is simply unnecessary).  But 
if the Court was driven by the absence of any historical evidence that Section 2 was 
meant to qualify the Equal Protection Clause, that would be precisely the time to 
employ the statutory canon of construction.  In other words, if there were no 
statement in the history of Section 2 one way or the other with respect to its effect on 
the Equal Protection Clause, as Craig seems to suggest, the canon serves as a proxy 
for that unexpressed intent: the latest and most specific provision is assumed to be 
the provision the enacting body intended to control. 
 76 See supra notes 19–54 and accompanying text. 
 77 See supra note 38. 
 78 See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
 79 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 80 See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
 81 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984). 
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that a constitution may contain a very late and very specific marriage 
amendment. 
II 
The Supreme Court’s Twenty-first Amendment cases, as I have 
interpreted them, may be read as abandoning the traditional canon 
of construction that later and more specific provisions govern over 
earlier and more general provisions.  But the canon, depending as it 
does on the timing of constitutional provisions, merits special 
attention in the constitutional context.  As I will argue below, there 
may be particular reasons—reasons grounded in what might be 
termed the atemporal nature of at least some constitutional 
provisions—for suspecting the later-governs-over-earlier canon a 
particularly ill fit in the constitutional context.  First, drawing on the 
Supreme Court’s retroactivity cases, I argue that, because some 
constitutional principles would seem to declare rather than create 
law, it makes little sense to conceive of those provisions as coming 
into existence on the date of ratification; declared law is better 
thought of as existing before, at, and after ratification.  Second, 
because equal protection provisions and privacy provisions are 
dynamic, drawing their meaning from an evolving sense of equality 
and autonomy, those provisions are especially difficult to locate in 
time; as evolving standards develop, those provisions might well be 
thought of as “later” than even later-ratified provisions. 
The Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence provides an 
interesting lens through which to consider the temporal dimensions 
of constitutional law.  Specifically, the retroactivity cases illustrate the 
theoretical difficulty with considering marriage amendments as 
“later” or equal protection or privacy provisions as “earlier” for 
purposes of applying the canon of construction that later provisions 
govern over earlier.  The Court’s retroactivity cases have wrestled with 
the extent to which a new judicial rule should apply to conduct that 
occurred prior to the new rule’s announcement.  The retroactivity 
cases decided by the Warren Court and continuing into the 1980s 
allowed for the prospective application of judicial rules under certain 
circumstances.  For example, the Court in Linkletter v. Walker82 held 
that the Mapp v. Ohio83 decision extending the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule to the states would not apply to state criminal 
 82 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
 83 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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convictions that had become final prior to the Mapp decision.84  The 
Court in Johnson v. New Jersey85 later extended the Linkletter 
retroactivity test to the question of whether new rules of criminal 
procedure ought to apply to defendants whose cases were pending on 
direct review.86  As a result of Linkletter and Johnson, quite a few new 
rules of criminal procedure were held not to apply to defendants 
whose convictions had become final or whose cases were pending on 
direct review when the new rule was articulated.  On the civil side, the 
Court similarly allowed for the selective prospective application of 
new judicial rules.87
Beginning in the 1980’s, with Griffith v. Kentucky,88 however, the 
Court began what would ultimately become an abandonment of its 
selective prospective application of new precedent in both the 
criminal and civil contexts.89  In Griffith, the Court held that its 
holding in Batson v. Kentucky90 should be applied to all cases on direct 
review, even those cases in which the race-based jury selection 
occurred before the Court formally held that such discrimination 
violated the Constitution.  As the Court explained in Griffith, the 
 84 In denying criminal defendants the benefit of the new Mapp rule on habeas 
review, the Court articulated a test for determining whether to allow a new rule of 
criminal procedure to apply retroactively to cases that had become final before the 
new rule was announced: weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking at 
the purpose of the new rule, the reliance placed on the previous doctrine, and the 
effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of the new rule.  
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. 
 85 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
 86 Id. at 728. 
 87 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).  The Chevron Oil Court 
articulated a test for whether a judicial rule should apply prospectively in the civil 
context.  Id. at 106-07.  Under the Chevron Oil test, a court was to consider whether 
the decision articulates a new principle of law, whether retroactive application would 
further or retard the operation of the new rule, and whether retroactive application 
of the new rule would produce substantial inequitable results.  Id. 
 88 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 89 The Court first disfavored prospective application in the criminal procedure 
context, with its decision in Griffith, holding that new rules of criminal procedure 
should be applied to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new rule was 
announced.  Id. at 328.  The Court’s criminal retroactivity jurisprudence was 
subsequently applied in the civil context in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 
U.S. 529 (1991).  With its decision in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, the 
Court fully incorporated its criminal procedure retroactivity jurisprudence into its 
civil retroactivity doctrine: “When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the 
parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be 
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, 
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the 
rule.”  509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). 
 90 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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prospective application of judicial precedents is incompatible with 
the “basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”91  The Court 
observed that “[u]nlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules 
of constitutional criminal procedure on a broad basis.”92  And, 
quoting Justice Harlan, the Court commented that: 
[i]f we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light 
of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, 
it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all. . . .  
In truth, the Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law 
in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full 
course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that our 
constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of 
legislation.93
 Under Griffith, the reasoning of which was later applied in the 
civil context as well, a court should decide all cases on direct review in 
light of the court’s best understanding of the law, regardless of 
whether that understanding was announced before or after the 
conduct at issue in the case.  This requirement that judicial rules be 
applied to conduct occurring both before and after the 
announcement of those rules is consistent with the view that judges 
declare, rather than create, law.94  The prospective application of 
 91 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 94 James B. Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 535–36 (noting that the Griffith approach 
“reflects the declaratory theory of law, according to which courts are understood only 
to find the law, not to make it”) (citations omitted). 
The view that judges in some sense declare, rather than create, law is, in fact, 
fundamental to a court’s day-to-day adjudicative function (quite apart from the 
question of whether new rules should be applied retroactively to other cases on 
direct review).  Consider the following example: Adjudicating a controversy between 
A and B, a court announces new rule X.  Even though the new rule X is announced 
after the relevant conduct between A and B has already occurred, by deciding the 
case and allocating relief as between A and B, the court treats X as though it were the 
law at the time of the relevant conduct between A and B.  In other words, the court is 
treated as declaring X—the declaration of which poses no theoretical problem when 
the rule is applied to A and B.  If, on the other hand, the court were construed as 
creating X, the application of X to A and B would be potentially unfair to whichever 
party had relied on X’s absence; after all, on a judge-creation theory, X was not the 
law when the relevant conduct occurred.  See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive 
and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811 (2003) 
(noting that courts typically decide cases based on what is perceived at the time of 
adjudication, not the state of the law before adjudication, and indicating that 
“[t]here is, of course, nothing unusual about such ‘retroactive’ applications of 
current law; in fact, they occur in the vast majority of cases without discussion or even 
thought”). 
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judicial decisions, on the other hand, a practice now thoroughly 
disfavored by the Court, is consistent with a view of judicial rules as 
judge-created, rather than judge-declared. 
Justice Scalia has been the most transparent of the justices in 
describing the neo-Blackstonian underpinnings of the Court’s 
retroactivity jurisprudence.  Considering the retroactivity of one of 
the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions, Justice Scalia commented at 
length: 
I share Justice Stevens’ perception that prospective 
decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to 
say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be.  The very 
framing of the issue that we purport to describe today—whether 
our [Commerce Clause decision] shall “apply” retroactively—
presupposes a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed 
to declaring what the law already is. . . . To hold a governmental 
Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it, but 
that the Constitution forbids it . . . .  Since the Constitution does 
not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our 
decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the 
notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular 
decision could take prospective form does not make sense.95
As Justice Scalia observed, even to ask whether the new rule “applies 
retroactively” is to misunderstand the new rule as being situated in 
time; asking whether a judicial rule “applies retroactively” is to 
suggest erroneously that the rule began when it was announced.  
Judicial law, as declared law, properly conceived, is atemporal.  Only 
statutory law or other created law, can properly be understood to 
“apply retroactively,” i.e. to be applied to situations that occurred 
before the statutory rule was created. 
Having described the distinction between declared and created 
law and the idea that judicial rules, as declared law, should not be 
prospectively applied, we now return to our hypothetical case of a 
marriage amendment conflicting with an earlier-ratified equal 
protection or privacy provision.  At first blush, it might appear that 
constitutional provisions are more like statutory provisions than 
judicial opinions and thus, like statutory provisions, ought to apply 
 95 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, in considering 
the retroactive effect of the Court’s ruling in Bacchus Imports, see supra notes 34–49 
and accompanying text, commented that the prospective application of judicial rules 
is inconsistent with the judicial power—“the power ‘to say what the law is,’ not the 
power to change it.”  James B. Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
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only prospectively.96  After all, unlike judicial decisions, which declare 
what the law is, constitutional provisions, like statutory provisions, 
would seem to create law, and thus present no conceptual difficulty  
if prospectively applied or treated as coming into existence  
with ratification.  The canon of construction preferring later 
constitutional provisions over earlier provisions could be applied, and 
the marriage amendment, as the later provision, would appear to 
govern over the marriage question. 
But if some constitutional provisions were determined not to 
create law, but instead to declare moral or natural law principles, the 
process of promulgating at least some “new” constitutional law may 
have much more in common with judicial decisionmaking than with 
legislation.  Because such constitutional provisions would merely 
declare, rather than create, those moral principles, it would make as 
little sense to argue that these provisions were “enacted” on their 
ratification dates as it would to suggest that judicial rules should apply 
only after their announcement.  In both cases, the declared rule, 
whether a constitutional provision or a judicial decision, is properly 
understood atemporally, as applying both before and after its 
ratification or announcing case.  Consequently, certain provisions of 
a constitution may not sensibly be susceptible to construction  
by appeal to the canon preferring later-, over earlier-, enacted 
provisions. 
At the federal level, any search in the Constitution for evidence 
of natural law principles typically begins with the text of the Ninth 
Amendment: “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights 
retained by the people.”97  Many commentators have seen in these 
“other” rights retained by the people express textual support in the 
Constitution for unexpressed, but fully enforceable moral or natural 
rights.98  By recognizing and securing rights not enumerated in the 
 96 See Mark Strasser, Baehr Mysteries, Retroactivity, and the Concept of Law, 41 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 161, 173–74 (2000) (discussing the strong presumption against the 
retroactive application of constitutional amendments to validate a previously void 
law); see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994) (“The 
principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate 
retrospectively, is familiar to every law student . . . .” (quoting United States v. Sec. 
Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982))). 
 97 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 98 See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND 
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 173 (1990) (“The Constitution itself does 
not claim to create or confer rights, it only ‘secures’ them.  And the Ninth 
Amendment explicitly calls upon constitutional interpreters not to ‘deny or 
disparage’ the existence of rights not stated explicitly in the Constitution’s text.”); see 
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Constitution, the Ninth Amendment seems to imply that at least 
some constitutional rights are not created by the Constitution, but 
instead are retained irrespective of whether they have been 
articulated.99  On this reading of the Ninth Amendment, had the 
framers failed to include provisions securing, for example, freedom 
of religion or freedom of speech, those human rights would 
nevertheless have been enforceable constraints against the exercise of 
governmental power.100  It follows, then, that it makes little sense to 
conceive of these provisions as coming into effect in 1791, when the 
Bill of Rights was ratified; they would exist and would be fully 
enforceable regardless of ratification at all, much less ratification on 
any particular date. 
Whether one accepts this view of the Ninth Amendment as 
providing a textual basis for enforcing unenumerated constitutional 
rights or not,101 it remains relatively noncontroversial that the framers 
also Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights 
“Retained” by the People, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND 
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 327, 327 n.2 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993); David 
N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAffee, 
in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra, at 367, 371–73.  Indeed, James 
Madison felt that the Ninth Amendment was necessary because an enumeration of 
certain rights in the Bill of Rights might be construed as signaling that any rights not 
enumerated are not constitutionally protected.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1790). 
 99 Similarly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appears to protect certain unenumerated individual rights from governmental 
encroachment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 100 While the Ninth Amendment has recently received significant scholarly 
attention, it has not played prominently as a textual authority for the Supreme 
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.  Probably the most famous invocation 
of the Ninth Amendment as a textual hook for the enforcement of unenumerated 
constitutional rights is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the 
Court held that unenumerated privacy rights created by various constitutional 
provisions, including the Ninth Amendment, precluded Connecticut from outlawing 
birth control for married couples.  The Court further noted that the right of privacy, 
far from being created by the Constitution, is “older than the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 
486.  Justice Goldberg, in his famous concurring opinion, made plain the centrality 
of the Ninth Amendment to the Court’s holding.  Id. at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (“My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted [to the 
express terms of the Bill of Rights] and that it embraces the right of marital privacy 
though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is supported both 
by numerous decisions of this Court . . . and by the language and history of the Ninth 
Amendment.”). 
 101 Others have argued that, although the Ninth Amendment provides that the 
enumeration of some rights does not imply the derogation of others, it does not 
provide an independent basis for the invalidation of legislation enacted pursuant to a 
delegated power.  See, e.g., McAffee, supra note 98, at 327.  But see Steven Heyman, 
Natural Rights and Positive Law, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 
98, at 381, 381; Mayer, supra note 98, at 367. 
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both spoke and thought in terms of natural rights and viewed the Bill 
of Rights as, to some degree, recognizing or declaring, rather than 
creating, those rights.102  That the framers believed in the a priori 
existence of certain rights can scarcely be doubted upon a reading of 
the first sentence of the Declaration of Independence, which 
provides that all human beings are endowed by a Creator with 
“certain inalienable rights.”  Because certain of the framers 
apparently intended that some constitutional provisions declare 
principles of natural or moral law, rather than create that law, it 
makes little sense to suppose that those principles began to exist only 
after their ratification.  For the same reasons animating the Supreme 
Court’s modern retroactivity jurisprudence, prospective application 
of constitutional provisions declaring (as opposed to creating) law 
does not make sense.  Every constitutional provision that declares a 
moral or natural law principle, properly conceived, existed before, 
during, and after the provision’s ratification.103  Relying on a “later” 
Still others have argued that the Ninth Amendment is a “rights” analog to the 
“powers” provision of the Tenth Amendment—that just as the powers not delegated 
to the federal government remain with the states, the articulation of certain federal 
rights should not be construed as denying or disparaging rights retained by the 
people under state law.  Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF 
THE NINTH AMENDMENT 243, 243 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).  President Ronald 
Reagan’s failed appointee to the United States Supreme Court, Robert Bork, 
famously referred to the Ninth Amendment as an indecipherable “inkblot” in the 
Constitution.  Bork later settled on the view, discussed above, that the provision 
protects rights retained by individuals under state law.  See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Sex, Lies, and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original 
Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1083 n.134 (1990), for a discussion of the 
implausibility of Bork’s understanding of the Ninth Amendment. 
 102 E.g., Eugene M. Van Loan III, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE 
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 101, at 149, 162–63 (“[T]he existence of 
natural law and natural rights and the latter’s immunity from governmental 
regulation were accepted by almost all.  Natural rights, therefore, were those which 
required no constitutional protection, and the addition of amendments covering 
them would only be ‘declaratory’ of their inviolability.”).  The irrelevance of the 
articulation of natural rights principles was argued forcefully by Alexander Hamilton: 
“The Sacred Rights of Mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments 
or musty records.  They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of 
human nature, by the hand of Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by 
mortal power.”  1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 113 (H. Lodge ed., 1904). 
While my discussion has focused on natural law in the U.S. Constitution, state 
constitutions, especially early constitutions, contain a great deal of language 
suggesting that the framers of those constitutions believed they were declaring, and 
not creating, certain natural law principles.  See Robert F. Williams, Equality 
Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985). 
 103 Walter Murphy has suggested one instance in which the Supreme Court may 
have treated constitutional provisions in exactly the atemporal manner that a law-as-
declared reading would require.  In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), in 
PAINTER FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  5:57:03 PM 
152 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:125 
 
provision as controlling in a particular case would only make sense 
when the Court is construing a rule in fact created by the Constitution. 
While some constitutional provisions declare moral or natural 
rights, others obviously do not.104  In determining whether to apply 
the canon of construction preferring later over earlier constitutional 
provisions, how, then, should one determine which constitutional 
provisions implicate moral or natural rights and which do not?  
Fortunately, the constitutional provisions at issue for purposes of this 
Article—equal protection provisions, privacy provisions, and 
marriage amendments—are relatively clear cases of the articulation 
of moral or natural law principles.105  Equality of treatment under the 
law, the right to be left alone in familial and sexual matters, and 
traditional norms of sexuality, to the respective advocates of each, 
considering the constitutionality of segregated schools in the District of Columbia, 
the Court may well have incorporated some portion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause (a later provision) into the Fifth Amendment (an earlier 
provision).  See Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the 
Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 163, 172 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (stating that, in 
Bolling, the “Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1791, 
incorporated at least some of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868.  There are, of course, other possible interpretations of 
Bolling, but none quite so intriguing . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 104 Compare, for example, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment with the Article II requirement that the president be at least 
thirty-five years old.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 105 State and federal privacy and equal protection provisions have as their 
archetype the Declaration of Independence and its catalog of the “inalienable rights” 
that are “endowed by the Creator.”  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 
1776).  Principles of equality and privacy, whether codified in constitutions or not, 
are the life-blood of liberal democracy.  Inequality, for example, in the form of 
slavery or denial of the franchise, did not become constitutionally suspect only with 
the passage of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.  This inequality was 
always deeply at odds with the very cornerstone of democracy: that all persons are 
created equal.  The same can be said of principles of privacy; they are grounded not 
in text but instead are fundamental to the concept of liberty itself. 
On the other side, marriage amendments can scarcely be viewed as anything 
other than collective statements of moral conviction—generally a religious 
conviction—that same-sex sex is, and has always been, deeply immoral.  Writing a 
separate concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick, then-Chief Justice Burger described 
same-sex sex as “the infamous crime against nature,” an offense of “deeper malignity 
than rape, a heinous act the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature.”  
478 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *215).  Justice Blackmun, 
demonstrating the natural law nature of the privacy right at stake, commented in his 
Bowers dissent that “this case is about the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men, namely, the right to be let alone.”  Id. at 199 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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represent bedrock moral or natural law principles.  On all sides of the 
marriage debate, opponents would tend to agree that these principles 
apply whether we recognize them or not, whether we live up to their 
ideals or not, and whether they are codified in our constitutions or 
not.  As declared principles, these principles are most properly 
thought of as atemporal; and situated out of time, it makes little 
sense, for purposes of constitutional interpretation, to view the 
marriage amendment as “later” or the equal protection or privacy 
provisions as “earlier.”  Consequently, with respect to these 
constitutional provisions, the canon of construction that prefers later 
and more specific provisions over earlier and more general provisions 
may be an inapt interpretive tool. 
There is a second fundamental problem with employing the 
later-over-earlier canon in the marriage context.  To the extent a 
constitution’s equal protection and privacy provisions are dynamic, 
drawing their content from evolving notions of equality and 
autonomy, they may well outgrow other contemporaneous or later 
provisions of that constitution.  In other words, as society evolves, 
those dynamic provisions also evolve and thus may properly be 
considered “later” than contemporary and later-ratified constitutional 
provisions that reflect outdated notions of equality and autonomy. 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Furman 
v. Georgia,106 struck capital punishment as it was then implemented as 
violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual” punishment.  The opinion was badly fractured, and the 
precise nature of the Court’s holding is difficult to discern, but a 
majority of the Court plainly embraced the view that the Eighth 
Amendment is not static, but instead “acquire[s] meaning as public 
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”107  In other 
words, a majority of the Court considered the Eighth Amendment 
sufficiently dynamic to potentially (though not as of yet) render capital 
punishment unconstitutional per se.108  And by recognizing this 
 106 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 107 Id. at 241 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)) 
(Douglas, J., concurring).  In other words, the content of the Eighth Amendment 
draws its meaning from “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”  Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 108 Justices Brennan and Marshall would have rendered capital punishment 
unconstitutional per se.  Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, 
J., concurring).  Although stopping short of declaring capital punishment 
unconstitutional per se, Justice White nevertheless indicated that, in his view, the 
moment capital punishment no longer furthers the social ends it has been deemed 
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interpretive possibility, the Court allowed that the Eighth 
Amendment, over time, might outgrow contemporaneous Fifth 
Amendment provisions109 that by their terms appear to place a 
constitutional imprimatur on capital punishment.110  By drafting the 
Fifth Amendment procedural protections contemporaneously with 
the Eighth Amendment at Time One (T1), we may assume that the 
framers viewed at least some instances of capital punishment 
(presumably those with adequate procedural safeguards) as non-
violative of the Eighth Amendment.  But, if at Time Two (T2), 
evolving standards of decency have evolved sufficiently, Furman 
to serve, it would be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 312 (White, J., 
concurring).  In two dissenting opinions, one written by Chief Justice Burger and the 
other by Justice Powell, each representing the views of the Chief Justice and Justices 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, capital punishment could in theory be 
unconstitutional per se under the Eighth Amendment.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 382–84 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 433–34 (Powell, J., dissenting).  According to Chief 
Justice Burger, state legislatures would likely invalidate death penalty statutes long 
before the Eighth Amendment would counsel striking capital punishment.  Id. at 
382–84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  According to Justice Powell, although it would in 
theory be possible to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se, such a holding 
would be exceedingly unlikely.  Id. at 433–34 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Writing 
separately, Justice Blackmun indicated that the Eighth Amendment may acquire 
meaning as public opinion evolves, but he felt that the Furman majority was slightly 
ahead of the public in its treatment of capital punishment.  Id. at 409–10 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
 109 The Fifth Amendment contains three clauses, or more accurately, parts of 
clauses, that would be without effect were the Eighth Amendment to be construed as 
rendering capital punishment unconstitutional per se: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury; . . . 
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . 
[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphases added). 
 110 That the Court was aware that it was endorsing an interpretive choice that 
might potentially render portions of the Fifth Amendment null is demonstrated by 
Chief Justice Burger’s and Justice Powell’s dissenting opinions, both of which 
pointed out the Fifth Amendment language providing procedural protections in 
capital cases.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Powell comes the closest to holding that the Fifth Amendment 
provisions preclude a holding that capital punishment is unconstitutional per se: 
“[T]he Court is not free to read into the Constitution a meaning that is plainly at 
variance with its language.”  Id. at 420 (Powell, J., dissenting).  But even Justice 
Powell concedes that the Fifth Amendment text is not dispositive.  As noted above, 
supra note 108, Justice Powell allowed that capital punishment could conceivably be 
unconstitutional per se, albeit by only the most “conclusive of objective 
demonstrations,” a nearly “insuperable” obstacle.  Id. at 433–34. 
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suggests that the Fifth Amendment provisions ratified at T1 may be 
rendered null. 
The Furman logic would apply not only to a provision ratified 
contemporaneously with the Eighth Amendment, but also to one 
ratified after the Eighth Amendment.  Assume that a hypothetical 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1921, providing 
that: “Any person duly convicted of treason against the United States 
shall be put to death.”  The hypothetical amendment undoubtedly 
reflects an understanding in 1921 that capital punishment was not 
cruel and unusual.  If, however, evolving standards of decency in 
2006 universally condemn the practice as cruel and unusual, the 
Court may, under Furman, hold that capital punishment is per se 
unconstitutional notwithstanding the 1921 amendment.  In other 
words, the Eighth Amendment, though earlier ratified, for purposes 
of constitutional interpretation, may well be considered “later” than 
our hypothetical 1921 amendment.111
By analogy, if equal protection or privacy provisions are 
understood as dynamic, reflecting society’s evolving standards of 
equality and autonomy,112 those provisions might be capable of 
 111 Of course, if there were evidence that the 1921 amendment were intended 
normatively to condition the Eighth Amendment, the Furman interpretive approach 
would be more problematic.  It should be noted, however, that absent evidence to 
the contrary, the text of the 1921 amendment does not, on its own, compel us to 
understand it as normatively conditioning the scope of the Eighth Amendment.  We 
might just as well read the 1921 amendment as describing the scope of then-
prevailing notions of cruelty (i.e., that the drafters of the 1921 amendment perceived 
no tension with the Eighth Amendment) without going the further step of 
concluding that the amendment was meant to preclude any future finding that 
capital punishment violates Eighth Amendment constitutional norms. 
The legislative history of the Hawaii marriage amendment illustrates the 
difficulty of discerning legislative intent on this score (not to mention the problem 
with discerning the intent of the “people”).  The legislative history also counsels 
against assuming that a later-ratified specific marriage amendment ipso facto 
conditions an earlier equal protection provision.  The final version of the Hawaii 
marriage amendment was the culmination of a long and tortuous compromise 
between the Hawaii House of Representatives, which wanted expressly to overrule 
Baehr’s holding that the same-sex marriage prohibition constituted gender 
discrimination under the equal protection provision, see supra note 7, and the Senate, 
which wanted expressly to preserve that holding.  For an extended discussion of the 
legislative history, see David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage Amendment: Its 
Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 42–82 (2000). 
 112 The Supreme Court has at various times endorsed both the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses as dynamic.  E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–73 
(2003) (indicating that the laws and emerging traditions of the last half-century are 
most instructive for purposes of interpreting the Due Process Clause and remarking 
that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending 
point of the substantive due process inquiry”) (citation omitted); Harper v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1966): 
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nullifying later-ratified provisions of the constitution that reflect 
earlier (mis)understandings of what the equal protection or privacy 
provisions require.  Just as in Furman, the fact that a later-ratified 
marriage amendment reflects certain assumptions about equality and 
autonomy at T2 ought not necessarily preclude prevailing notions of 
equality and autonomy at T3 from rendering the marriage 
amendment inoperative, notwithstanding that the equal protection 
or privacy provision was ratified at T1.  In other words, when 
considering a dynamic provision, it makes far more sense to consider 
it as coming into effect at T3, for purposes of applying the later-
governing-over-earlier canon, rather than on its date of ratification at 
T1.
113  In the case of dynamic provisions that draw meaning from 
changing social circumstances, then, ratification dates might be 
particularly irrelevant for purposes of deciding which of two 
conflicting provisions should govern.  The conceptual difficulty with 
locating dynamic constitutional provisions in time seriously 
undermines the utility of the statutory canon. 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s Twenty-first Amendment 
cases, which suggest interpretive space for rejecting the canon of 
construction that later and more specific provisions govern over 
earlier and more general provisions, we have examined two 
conceptual problems with applying the canon in the constitutional 
context.  Determining which constitutional provision is “later” than 
another is particularly difficult, both for provisions that appear  
to declare moral and natural law principles and for provisions that 
are dynamic, drawing their meaning from changing social 
circumstances. 
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of 
a particular era.  In determining what lines are unconstitutionally 
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of 
equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed 
catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of 
fundamental rights.  Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes 
of the Equal Protection Clause do change. 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 113 It makes as little sense to suggest that by passing a marriage amendment, the 
“people” must have intended to condition the Equal Protection Clause, as it does to 
suggest that by writing procedural protections into the Fifth Amendment, or by 
passing a subsequent hypothetical amendment, the framers must have intended to 
carve capital punishment from the ambit of the Eighth Amendment.  See supra notes 
106–11 and accompanying text. 
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III 
 I have argued that the Supreme Court’s Twenty-first 
Amendment jurisprudence can be read as a model for rejecting the 
traditional modes of statutory interpretation in the constitutional 
context.  The Court provides for an interpretive approach permitting 
a later and more specific amendment to be considered in light of 
constitutional principles articulated in earlier and more general 
provisions.  Indeed, the Court’s Twenty-first Amendment cases 
illustrate that one provision does not necessarily trump another 
merely because it is later or more specific.  I have also suggested that 
there may be particular problems in the constitutional context with 
the statutory canon requiring that later provisions govern over earlier 
ones. 
There may be a basis, then, both grounded in precedent and 
theoretically sound, for rejecting, at least in the constitutional 
context, the canon of construction that later and more specific 
provisions govern over earlier and more general provisions.  If so, 
there may be no basis (or at least less basis) for concluding that 
marriage amendments automatically trump any claim to a same-sex 
marriage right grounded in a constitution’s privacy or equal 
protection provisions.  To be clear, under the interpretive approach I 
have suggested, judges considering such marriage-right claims have 
an interpretive choice to make: either follow the marriage 
amendment or follow the equality or privacy provision.  There may 
be persuasive reasons for choosing one provision over the other, but 
there is a choice to be made—a choice that ought to be deliberate and 
explained. 
Regardless of the theoretical legitimacy of my suggested 
interpretive alternative, there may be extremely persuasive reasons 
for rejecting it.  To the extent judicial articulation of a same-sex 
marriage right as constitutionally required has met with widespread 
backlash, any judicial invalidation of state (or federal) marriage 
amendments (no matter how justified as an interpretive move) may 
be perceived as bald judicial activism.114  And perhaps my interpretive 
 114 Principally, it might be argued that if judges adopted the interpretive approach 
I suggest in this Article, they would be essentially amending state (and possibly 
federal) constitutions outside the formal amendment processes established in those 
documents.  Of course, this criticism assumes that the amendment processes 
articulated in state and federal constitutions are the exclusive ways those documents 
may be revised.  For an alternative to this exclusive view, see Akhil Reed Amar, 
Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, 
supra note 103, at 89.  As a descriptive matter, it is extremely problematic to 
contextualize the most fundamental changes in our constitutional regime as 
PAINTER FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  5:57:03 PM 
158 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:125 
 
suggestions should be rejected to the extent they would commonly be 
perceived as undermining the democratic processes that gave rise to 
those state (and perhaps federal) marriage amendments. 
But what of the future?  If and when future generations come to 
a more nuanced understanding of the range of human sexualities, 
and a more inclusive understanding of the fundamental legitimacy of 
same-sex relationships, might not the continued enforcement of state 
(and federal) constitutional marriage prohibitions be construed as 
undermining the principles of equality enshrined in those same 
constitutions?  Might not the continued denial of meaningful access 
by gays and lesbians to legislative reform on the issue of marriage 
equality deeply offend the principle of democratic participation also 
written into those constitutions? 
Questions concerning constitutional legitimacy—the people’s 
collective faith in its state and federal constitutions—are of central 
importance any time amendments to those constitutions are 
contemplated.  The effect of a potential constitutional amendment 
on our collective faith in the document, both now and in the future, 
should play as major a role in the deliberation of a proposed 
amendment as the particular policy objectives of the amendment 
itself.  Constitutional legitimacy is fragile; ill-conceived amendments 
may chip away at our faith in our constitutions and ultimately 
compromise our systems of government.115
Unlike statutory compilations, constitutional legitimacy does not 
depend on any extraconstitutional referent.  To determine whether a 
federal legislative statement, X, is good law, one need only determine 
whether X has been passed by both houses of Congress and signed by 
the President, as spelled out in Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution116 (or, in the case of a state law, the analogous state 
constitutional provision).  Any proposition that complies with the 
occurring strictly within the framework of Article V.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, 
Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION, supra note 103, at 37; Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 103, at 63.  For a further reason to suppose 
that Article V (and similar textual provisions for amendment in state constitutions) is 
not the exclusive means of amendment, see infra notes 116–20 and accompanying 
text. 
 115 Advocates of the Federal Marriage Amendment may be well advised to 
consider the effect of the Eighteenth Amendment on the collective faith in the 
American constitutional system.  See KYVIG, supra note 42, at 97 (observing that a 
great deal of the momentum for repeal was based on growing sentiment that the 
Prohibition Amendment distorted the constitutional system by granting to the 
federal government the sort of police power traditionally left to the states). 
 116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
PAINTER FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  5:57:03 PM 
2005] RESERVING THE RIGHT 159 
 
requirements of Article I, Section 7 is good (although not necessarily 
provident) law.  There is no extraconstitutional text or process to 
which constitutions turn for legitimacy.  As Frederick Schauer has 
questioned, given two documents labeled “Constitution of the United 
States,” one housed at the United States Archives, and the other 
sketched out on the yellow legal pad on my desk, each claiming to be 
the Constitution, how does one know which one is the Constitution?  
Whatever the source of constitutional legitimacy of the version 
contained in the national archives, it comes from something beyond 
the text.  For although we know very well that the constitution on my 
legal pad is entirely fictive, it, like the version at the archives, claims 
to be the authentic Constitution.117
The important point here is that a constitution’s legitimacy is 
not grounded in any other validating legal text or principle, and it is 
likewise not grounded in the text of the constitution itself.  The 
legitimacy of state and federal constitutions is a political fact, what 
Schauer, following H.L.A. Hart, calls the “ultimate rule of 
recognition.”118  A constitution that is not recognized as legitimate by 
the governed (as a matter of political fact) is not the Constitution.  A 
constitution that is recognized by the governed as legitimate is the 
Constitution.  And, as Schauer explains, once one recognizes that 
constitutions may be wholly or partially displaced as the rule of 
recognition itself changes,119 constitutions necessarily may be 
amended outside formal amendment mechanisms as social and 
political contexts alter collective constitutional understandings.120
 117 Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 103, at 145, 145. 
 118 Id. at 150.  The rule of recognition—the way in which we know whether law is 
valid or not—for statutes is found in constitutions (a statute is valid if it came into 
being in accordance with procedural norms articulated in the constitution).  
Constitutional validity, the ultimate rule of recognition, looks not to another legal 
principle, but is instead a question of fact.  Id. at 152. 
 119 A constitutional regime may be partially or wholly displaced, for example, by 
revolution—the people’s choice of a new constitutional regime over an old without 
complying with the terms of amendment contained in the earlier constitution. 
 120 Schauer provides an example: 
[I]f the American people came to the realization that the Second 
Amendment’s seeming protection of the right to keep and bear arms 
was simply obsolete and unwise in light of the realities of 1994, and if 
that view were shared by legislative, executive, and judicial officials, and 
if all proceeded to treat the Second Amendment as a nullity despite the 
fact that it had not been repealed according to the provisions of Article 
V, then it would be accurate to say that the Constitution of the United 
States did not contain the provision designated as “Amendment II” in 
most versions of the document titled “the Constitution of the United 
States.”  The small c constitution would thus have been amended by 
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If constitutions can be amended outside formal amendment 
mechanisms as the ultimate rule of recognition changes, it follows 
that if the ultimate rule of recognition today is sufficiently 
incongruous with the ultimate rule of recognition when the 
constitution was drafted, the official constitution (at least its official 
text), would not necessarily be the Constitution.  Consequently, if the 
ultimate rule of recognition is at variance with the constitution’s text, 
rigid adherence to that text would, in a literal sense, be 
unconstitutional.  More importantly, following the text in such a 
circumstance would violate agreed-upon constitutional norms and 
would run the risk of undermining our collective faith in the 
document itself as the Constitution. 
To the extent a marriage amendment that no longer conforms 
to the ultimate rule of recognition is enforced, the legitimacy of 
constitutional governance itself is potentially undermined.  The 
problem is all the more exacerbated when one considers the frailty of 
the amendment process as a corrective measure: once lodged in the 
constitution (especially at the federal level), a marriage amendment, 
even one that has become disfavored since ratification, can be 
extraordinarily difficult to repeal.121  Under these circumstances, 
following the Court’s Twenty-first Amendment model and 
virtue of this amendment to the ultimate rule of recognition, even 
though it could also be accurately said that the large C Constitution 
had not been validly amended according to its own terms. 
Schauer, supra note 117, at 156–57. 
 121 The Eighteenth Amendment is instructive on this point.  Even as the law 
became increasingly disfavored as violating states’ rights, discouraging temperance, 
and undermining the constitutional system, many anti-prohibitionists thought that 
the Amendment would be a permanent fixture of American life.  No matter the 
extent of the public outcry against the Amendment, it would remain in the 
Constitution so long as prohibitionists had a certain amount of political clout in just 
over a quarter of the states.  See KYVIG, supra note 42, at 201 (“[T]he history of 
prohibition repeal demonstrated the difficulty of overturning a constitutional 
provision and the massive, sustained effort required. . . .”); see also David E. Kyvig, 
Arranging for Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of Constitutional Design, in UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 9, 10 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000).  The 
Depression, and the public perception that repeal would generate much-needed 
revenues, may well have been the variables that made repeal of the Eighteenth 
Amendment possible. 
Certain state constitutional amendments prohibiting interracial marriage are 
also potentially illustrative of the difficulty of repeal.  For example, despite 
presumably wide popular support for its repeal in recent years, Alabama did not 
repeal its constitutional ban on miscegenation until 2000.  Elizabeth Becker et al., 
The 2000 Elections: State-by-State: South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at B15.  Similarly, 
South Carolina’s ban was repealed in 1998.  South Carolina Removes Ban on Interracial 
Marriage, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/ 
1998/11/03/election/ballots/interracial.marriage/index.html. 
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abandoning the statutory canon, a judge would not be “activist,” at 
least to the extent “activist” is defined as countermajoritarian; rather, 
by abandoning the canon of construction and nullifying the marriage 
amendment, the judge would be restoring to the constitution its 
rightful claim to authority as recognized by the ultimate rule of 
recognition.  The judge would be doing what the formal amendment 
process may be impotent to accomplish, nominally laying to rest a 
marriage amendment that has for all intents and purposes already 
been amended out of the constitution by popular opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
When judges consider constitutional challenges to same-sex 
marriage bans (or challenges to the denial of marriage benefits), they 
have interpretive choices to make.  In those cases in which there is a 
late and specific constitutional marriage amendment and an earlier 
and more general equal protection or privacy provision, judges might 
elect to decide those cases under the marriage amendment, following 
the traditional canon of construction that later and more specific 
provisions govern over earlier and more general provisions.  And, as I 
have suggested, there are other legitimate interpretive moves as well. 
There may be persuasive reasons for abandoning the canon of 
construction when considering the relationship between a marriage 
amendment and an equal protection or privacy provision.  First, the 
Supreme Court, in its Twenty-first Amendment cases, advocated a 
balancing of constitutional interests rather than a mechanical 
application of the canon.  And wrestling with the various 
constitutional interests at stake in its Twenty-first Amendment cases, 
the Court greatly restricted the operation of Section 2, the later and 
more specific provision dealing with the transportation and 
importation of liquor.  Second, there are theoretical difficulties with 
locating certain kinds of constitutional provisions in time, thus calling 
into question the possibility of coherently applying the statutory 
canon in the marriage context. 
Going forward, as both sexual norms and attitudes about lesbian 
and gay families change over time, courts may well be advised, in the 
interest of not undermining constitutional legitimacy, to balance the 
constitutional interests at stake rather than simply assuming that the 
canon of construction provides the exclusive avenue of 
interpretation.  Whatever the interpretive outcome, however, we do 
well to recognize the range of available interpretive choices.  Simply 
assuming, without any discussion at all, that marriage amendments 
remove the marriage question from the ambit of equal protection 
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and privacy provisions, makes too easy work of a far more 
complicated question.  The mechanical application of the canon may 
provide the feeling of distance from the constitutional interests at 
stake, but as Justice Frankfurter recognized, ultimately, the “canons 
of construction [cannot] save us from the anguish of judgment.  Such 
canons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in 
fact a delicate judgment, concluding a complicated process of 
balancing subtle and elusive elements.”122
 
 122 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
527, 535 (1947). 
